🕸📝Fergus Duniho wrote on Mon, Jul 17, 2006 09:49 PM UTC:
You're proposing this set of votes:
M36 > A > M32
M32 > A > M36
According to Stephen Eppley's MAM Calc script, which runs through the PHP
on my website at http://www.duniho.com/remote-mamcalc.php, A would win. The
condorcet method favors the least objectionable candidate to all voters. If
only two people were to play one game, and they chose which game from three
games, with votes like these, then A is the choice that is going to
minimize discontent. If one of the voters really preferred either version
of Mir Chess to A, voting to reflect his true preferences would allow one
of the versions of Mir Chess to win over A. The MAM method will reflect
voter preferences so long as people vote their true preferences. It can't
and shouldn't be expected to secondguess what anyone's preferences would
be. I have previously examined several voting methods. I consider the
condorcet method to be the best in general, and I consider MAM to be the
best version of the condorcet method.